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I. INTRODUCTION
B UYING and selling goods and services-commodification-
has always been an active practice in the United States. As
commodification has extended into non-traditional areas, the law
has followed. Congress actively regulates the buying and selling,
and even the gratuitous transfer, of information in the course of
stock trading.' State courts and legislatures are currently strug-
gling with the legitimacy of commodifying surrogate motherhood
services.- In a less dramatic, but equally important, context the
Supreme Court recently considered the propriety of buying and
selling a private right of action granted by federal law. 3 In Town of
Newton v. Rumery, the Supreme Court allowed commodification of
a federal private right of action when it upheld an agreement in
which a state prosecutor agreed to drop criminal charges on the
condition that the criminal defendant agree to waive his right to
sue for the claimed wrongful arrest under the generic federal civil
rights statute of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 4
The Supreme Court's affirmation of the buying and selling of
private rights of action has consequences beyond section 1983.
The United States Congress regulates private conduct not only
through the administrative state but also by empowering private
citizens to sue for acts that Congress declares violative of public
policy. Hundreds of federal statutes expressly provide private
rights of action 5 and the courts have implied private rights of ac-
tion under numerous others. 6 Through these private rights of ac-
1. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1982) (prohibits insider trading and limits tim-
ing of purchase and sale of securities by directors, officers, and principal
shareholders).
2. See, e.g'., In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988) (refusing to
enforce surrogate parenting agreement since agreement conflicted with, inter
alia, laws prohibiting use of money in connection with adoptions and state public
policy); Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong,
704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986) (statute prohibiting purchase of child for adoption
does not prevent surrogate motherhood contract entered into before concep-
tion); Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981) (interpreting
statute prohibiting purchase of child for adoption as prohibiting surrogate
parenting agreement), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983). See generally Note, DeVel-
oping a Concept of the Modern "Fanily"." A Proposed (Jiiform Surrogate Parenthood Act,
73 GEO. I.J 1283, 1283 (1985) (no consistency by courts ard no comprehensive
statute adopted by any state legislature).
3. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987). For a complete dis-
cussion of Rimery, see infra notes 52-83 and accompanying text.
4. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 398. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
5. A LEXIS search revealed over 600 federal statutes which allow for an
aggrieved party to sue. LEXIS, Genfed Library.
6. See, e.g., Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984) (Investment
Company Act); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S.
430 [Vol. 34: p. 429
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PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
tion, Congress empowers individual aggrieved persons to sue if
certain acts or omissions are committed by another. When the
prospective defendant commits a wrongful act under the statute,
the statute permits, but does not require, the prospective plaintiff
to sue. By giving the prospective plaintiff the power-but not the
duty-to sue, Congress creates a volatile relationship between
these prospective plaintiffs and defendants. These parties may
seek agreements about when, if ever, a prospective plaintiff will
bring or follow through with a lawsuit.
Agreements not to proceed with private rights of action oc-
cur in two generic forms. When these agreements occur before
the statutory wrongful act has taken place, or when the prospec-
tive defendant requires the agreement not to sue in order to stop
the claimed wrongful act, the plaintiff waives his or her right to
sue. In these instances the prospective plaintiffs and defendants
are not disputing over actions already taken, but are bargaining
about future conduct by the statutory defendant. For example, if
an employer asks an employee to waive all protections under non-
discrimination laws in exchange for higher wages, a waiver oc-
curs. The employer has not yet committed any claimed wrongful
act, unless the offer itself is a statutory violation. If valid, the
agreement protects the employer from any private rights of action
by that employee should the employer commit violations. Simi-
larly, in Rumery the defendant claimed that his arrest on criminal
charges was unlawful. If true, then the state's decision to drop
the criminal charges in return for the criminal defendant's agree-
ment not to sue under section 1983 was a form of waiver. Be-
cause the pending charges were a harm arising out of the arrest,
7
the state was saying that it would alter its conduct and stop the
claimed wrongful act only on condition that the criminal defend-
ant agree to waive his civil action. Both prospective waiver and
353 (1982) (Commodity Exchange Act); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677 (1979) (Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Section 10(b), and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5). See
also Curran, 456 U.S. at 408-09 n.17 (Powell, J., dissenting) (computer search
showed that in decade before Currau there had been "at least 243 reported
Court of Appeals opinions and 515 District Court opinions dealing with the
existence of implied causes of action under various federal statutes").
7. Refusal to stop wrongful conduct unless the prospective plaintiff (who is
also the criminal defendant) agrees to waive any civil suit is a simultaneous
waiver if the private right of action gives the plaintiff a right to damages. If the
prospective civil plaintiff is only entitled to an injunction, then the distinction
between waiver and settlement in this context collapses.
1989]
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simultaneous waiver have the effect of directly altering the pro-
spective defendant's conduct.
More frequently, these agreements take place after the
claimed wrongful act, in which case the plaintiff (either prospec-
tive or actual) is settling the underlying dispute." With settlement,
the operative acts over which the parties will dispute have already
occurred. Rather than focusing on the defendant's future con-
duct, the dispute focuses on how to discover, characterize or label
the past events.
Both waiver and settlement have in common the limited com-
modification of the dispute created by public law, despite the fact
that the public law was often passed to interfere with the private
market. Settlement is an endemic part of our dispute resolution
system and is generally embraced warmly by courts. 9 Waiver is
much more problematic, sometimes treated as if it were a settle-
ment of an ongoing dispute and other times treated with much
less deference by courts.' 0 The purpose of this article is to ex-
amine the complex relationship created by private rights of action
in order to better understand when commodification of private
rights of action-through waiver and settlement-is appropriate.
This article focuses on federal positive law, those "reassur-
ing" rights created by statute.'' In this article "private right of
action" refers to an express or implied grant by Congress to an
individual to sue if certain acts or omissions are committed by
another.' 2 Because this article focuses on federal statutory causes
of action, the issue of waiver and settlement is always governed
8. Courts often use the terms "settlement" and "waiver" interchangeably.
See, e.g., Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1945) (Court uses
term "waiver" to describe what is defined in this article as "settlement").
9. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a) (judge may order pretrial conference to facilitate
settlement); FED. R. Civ. P. 68 (offer of judgment), infra Section IV D. But see
O'Neil, 324 U.S. at 713-14 (where there is no bonafide dispute as to liability of
employer, employee's release of rights to minimum wages and liquidated dam-
ages under Fair Labor Standards Act, for sum less than statutory minimum
wages due, is void).
10. See infra Section III.
11. J. WALDRON, THEORIES OF RIGHTS 4 (1984). I am, therefore, talking
about primary rules-those that grant rights and impose obligations. The un-
derlying question, however, is over a secondary rule, how these primary rules
are to be created or changed. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89-96 (196 1). For
purposes of this article I do not question whether Congress was correct in creat-
ing these private rights of action.
12. In Hohfeldian terms, this is an enforceable claim by a prospective plain-
tiff if certain operative facts exist. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Concepts .As
Applied In Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 25-28 (1913) (discussion of opera-
tive facts versus evidential facts).
432 [Vol. 34: p. 429
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and determined by congressional intent. 13 This hardly settles the
issue, however. With some constitutional limitations, Congress
could allow or disallow waiver or settlement, as it sees fit.' 4 Con-
gress rarely states expressly that statutory causes of action can or
cannot be waived or settled, leaving the question open under
most statutes.' 5 As the virulent debate over both constitutional
and statutory interpretation has shown, interpreting the meaning
of words either from the words themselves, the perspective of the
drafters, or the perspective of the implementors of the statutes is
not an easy task.' 6 Courts, as interpreters of the text, have lati-
tude in answering the interstitial questions, such as whether
waiver or settlement is allowed.' 7 Whatever interpretive philoso-
phy the decision maker uses, the interpreter must rely on some
principles of construction. The goal of this article is to develop a
framework for statutory construction for waiver and settlement of
federal private rights of action.' 8
Private rights of action can be part of a complex enforcement
scheme or can stand alone as a relatively simple statutory state-
13. See O'Neil, 324 U.S. at 704-05 ("With respect to private rights created by
a federal statute .... the question of whether the statutory right may be waived
depends upon the intention of Congress as manifested in the particular stat-
ute."). How to interpret the settlement agreement once it has been reached
presents a very different question. See Solimine, Enforcement and Inteipretation of
Settlements of Federal Civil Rights Actions, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 295, 318-39 (1988) (argu-
ing that state law and not federal common law should govern civil rights settle-
ment agreements).
14. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S..364 (1984) (prohi-
bition of editorializing by broadcasters who receive federal grants from Corpo-
ration for Public Broadcasting violates first amendment). See also Rosenthal,
Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1120-23
(1987) (no clear answer whether conferring of privilege can be conditional on
conduct which could not otherwise be compelled).
15. See, e.g.. O'Neil, 324 U.S. at 712 & n.29; 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986) (private settlement and waiver not addressed); 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982) (settlement and waiver not addressed).
16. See, e.g., Abraham, Statutory Inteipretation and Literary Theory: Some Common
Concerns of an Unlikely Pair, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 676 (1979); Grev, The Constitution
As Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REXV. 1 (1984): Levinson. Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L.
REV. 373 (1982) (symposium).
17. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 16, at 677-90; Grev, supra note 16 (discuss-
ing many methods of interpretation); Levinson, supra note 16, at 378-84 (same).
18. Hence, this article is not about a "flirst order" question of who is enti-
tled to compensation or whether Congress should have passed a particular stat-
ute, but rather a "second order" question concerning the manner of protection.
See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, 1.,iabilit y Rules, and Inalienlabiliy: One lew
o/ the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). The ultimate goal of this
article is to attempt to use alternative language to describe this phenomenon of
waiver and settlement. (.j. Calabresi, Thoughts on the Future of Economiics iii Legal
Education, 33 J. L.E(;A Ernti(. 359, 363-64 (1983) (proper choice of language may
highlight similarities and diflerences between terms).
1989] 433
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ment creating a right-to sue. Section II of this article gives three
examples of private rights of action and by analogizing to con-
cepts of property ownership, describes the attributes of private
rights of action. In analyzing private rights of action as property,
with the United States Congress as grantor, we can better articu-
late some of the public components of private rights of action.
Section III then looks at the two paradigms used by courts to de-
termine the validity of waivers. Courts usually start their statu-
tory construction analysis for waiver from either a private contract
model or a right-duty perspective. With a private contract model,
waiver is treated as simply a private agreement and is allowed,
absent congressional indication or public policy to the contrary.
With a "right-duty" model, the courts begin their analysis by fo-
cusing on the rights and duties imposed by the statute, rather
than a presumptive validity of the waiver. With these models in
mind, Section IV discusses the complex interests involved in pri-
vate rights of action, including those of the holders of the causes
of action and the government as grantor of the private cause of
action. Both compensatory and deterrent goals are present in
private rights of action and each of these goals has interdepen-
dent public and private components. Using the interests analysis
developed in Section IV, Section V discusses why courts should
construe federal private rights of action to be presumptively un-
waivable absent clear congressional indications to the contrary.
By indicating how rights and interests change over time, Section
V also sets out reasons why settlement is presumptively valid.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
Private rights of action can be given in many forms, from ge-
neric causes of action that contain few non-substantive limitations
to highly contingent causes of action that require the statutory
plaintiffs to take numerous procedural steps before the right to
sue arises. Occasionally, Congress sets out the wrongful act and
the private right of action in a single, efficient paragraph. For ex-
ample, the grandparent of both private rights of action and mod-
ern civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides a generic
private right of action by incorporating other substantive rights.
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of ... [state law]
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person
within the jurisdiction Iof the United States] to the depri-
434 [Vol. 34: p. 429
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vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party in-
jured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress."I
The statutory plaintiffs are potentially every person within the
United States. The class of statutory defendants is much smaller,
comprising "every person" who, in the interpretations of the
courts, engages in state action.20 In a separate provision the gov-
ernment is given penal authority to prosecute for violation of
these same "rights, privileges, and immunities." 2' Prospective
plaintiffs are not required to file any notice with the government
or satisfy any specific requirements beyond the generic limitations
ofjurisdiction and the statute of limitations.
In contrast, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) creates a
more complex scheme for enforcement. 22 The FLSA, which is
the grandparent of modern economic regulation of the
workforce, issues an affirmative command to employers to pay a
minimum wage and overtime. 23 In a separate provision the FLSA
imposes liability and sets out specific remedies, again as a com-
mand: "Any employer who violates the provisions [requiring
minimum wage and overtime payments] shall be liable to the em-
ployee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid mini-
mum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case
may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated dam-
ages." 24 An action to recover these amounts due "may be main-
tained ...by any one or more employees for and in behalf of
himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated."2 5
As with section 1983, the aggrieved employees are not required
to meet any filing requirements before filing suit. Unlike section
1983, however, if the government acting through the Secretary of
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
20. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-87 (1971) (interpreting
phrase "under color of state law" in 42 U.S.C. § 1983), overruled in part. Moncll v.
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978) (Alonrwe overruled
only insofar as it held local governments wholly immune fiom suit under
§ 1983).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 1987 (1982). Se,'als Snvder, %. IRS.
596 F. Stipp. 240, 245 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 "arc simply
the criminal law versions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1983.").
22. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
23. Id. §§ 206-207.
24. Id. § 216(b).
25. Id. Under the FI.SA the staittory plaintiil and defendants arc limited
to employees and employers, except as exempted. Id. § 213.
1989] 435
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Labor elects to file suit in the wage and hour dispute, the individ-
ual's private right of action terminates. 26 This distinction, how-
ever, is understandable since only one back wage and liquidated
damages remedy will be awarded to an employee under the
FLSA. The termination of the private suit therefore prevents du-
plicative suits for the same violation which seek the same remedy
for the same parties.
27
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 sets up an even more
complex method of creating a private right of action. The
prohibitions of Title VII also impose a duty upon prospective de-
fendants by stating that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire.., or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 28 In a
separate provision, Title VII requires the plaintiff to file an ad-
ministrative charge stating the claimed wrongful act within a set
statutory period before filing suit.29 If the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which is charged with enforc-
ing Title VII, files suit or refers the case to the United States At-
torney General to file suit, the aggrieved persons have the right to
intervene in the suit.3 0 If the EEOC takes no action within a set
period of time, the aggrieved person has ninety days to file suit.-"
The EEOC or the United States Attorney General can "intervene
in such civil action upon certification that the case is of general
public importance."3 2
These three statutes exemplify the range of interactions be-
tween private and government enforcement of a statute. Regard-
less of whether the private action is completely unmonitored by a
26. Id. § 216(b) ("The right provided by this subsection to bring an action
.. shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary of Labor in an
action under section 217 of this title .... "). The Secretary of Labor may bring
suit for injunctive relief under 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1982).
27. S. REp. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 39, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1620, 1659; see also Donovan v. University ofl'ex., 643
F.2d 1201, 1206-07 (5th Cir. 1981) (comparing and contrasting enforcement
under Title VII and FLSA). In contrast, the government parallel for § 1983, 18
U.S.C. § 242, provides for distinct criminal remedies not duplicated by a civil
suit. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982). The Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA) uses almost identical language to provide a private right of
action, substituting the word "age" in lieu of the litle VII classes. 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(1) (1982).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
436 [Vol. 34: p. 429
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governmental agency, as with section 1983, or is monitored by
notice requirements, as with Title VII, each of these private rights
of action is the product of congressional largess. Through the
Constitution we, "the People," 33 gave broad power to Congress
to regulateA4 Through legislation, Congress confers on certain
classes of people private rights of action that these individuals
would not have been able to assert otherwise. In one sense pri-
vate rights of action can be characterized as a "gift" by Congress.
However, this "gift" is not purely altruistic, for the grantor ex-
pects to derive some benefit, often indirect, from the "gift." 35
Although there may be many variable purposes for granting these
private rights to sue, in each example the existence of a private
right of action has the consequence, and in most instances we can
infer the purpose, of widening the statute's enforcement at a low
cost to the government.
3 6
The relationship between plaintiffs and defendants under
each of these statutes is far more complex than simply stating in
Hohfeldian terms that because defendant has a duty, plaintiff has
a right, or vice versa.3 7 To begin with, we are often talking about
two related rights created by statute. For example, under Title
VII, employees have a right to the underlying statutory protection
(not to be discriminated against on the basis of race, creed, color,
sex or national origin) and a conditional right to bring a civil ac-
tion if that underlying statutory protection is violated and if the
procedural requirements set out in the statute are met.
The relationship between the statutory plaintiffs, defendants
and the government can be better understood by describing pri-
vate rights of action-this congressional "gift"-in property
terms. As the Supreme Court has recognized, "a cause of action
is a species of property."3 8 Property is no longer conceptualized
33. U.S. CONST. preamble.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
35. An interesting variation of this "gift" concept was utilized in seven-
teenth century England by judges who analyzed taxes as if they were a private
gift from the taxpayer to the government. Horwitz, The History of the Pub-
lic/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1423-24 (1982).
36. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18, at 1093. Cf General Tel. Co. of
the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 324-25 (1980) (expanded enforce-
ment for EEOC designed to bring about more effective enforcement of private
rights); Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIEs ABOUT
COURTS 136-37 (K. Boyum & L. Mather ed. 1983) ("All legal agencies have more
authoritative commitments to do things than resources to carry them out.").
37. See Hohfeld, supra note 12, at 30-32.
38. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982) (employee
claiming wrongful discharge had state created entitlement to use state's adminis-
1989] 437
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as simply a "thing," or even rights over a "thing," but rather
property represents legal relationships. 39 Property can represent
maximum ownership interests, such as the right to possess, use,
manage, derive income and capital, have, secure, and transmit at
will.4o Or, as in the case of private rights of action, the interests
contained in the private right of action may be limited.
We begin with the obvious point. Because the private right
of action is a creation of congressional policy, an individual em-
powered to sue does not inherently possess the cause of action in
its entirety. Just like any grantee of property, an individual takes
subject to the limitations of the grantor. And just as a grantor can
give a non-vested interest rather than a fee simple absolute, Con-
gress may impose (within constitutional limitations) conditions
precedent, such as administrative filing requirements, and make
trative and judicial processes to argue claim) (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)). See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972) ("property" is broad and majestic term, extending well
beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (more realistic to regard welfare entitlements as
"property" rather than as gratuities) (citing Reich, Individual Rights and Social
Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965)); J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.5 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
NOWAK]. The existence of the entitlement turns on "the nature of the interest at
stake." Roth, 408 U.S. at 571. This entitlement may be grounded in federal,
state or local law and must be defined in such a way that the individual would
continue to receive it under existing law. NOWAK, supra § 13.5, at 474. In Logan,
the Court noted that a state statutory cause of action gave the claimant "more
than an abstract desire or interest in redressing his grievance." Logan, 455 U.S.
at 431. This property interest in an "entitlement" does not include mere "ex-
pectancies," although the distinction can be difficult to discern. NOWAK, supra
§ 13.5, at 475. This power to sue is not a mere expectancy because it can cause
significant changes in behavior on the part of persons protected. See infra Sec-
tion IV C. As the Logan Court noted, a cause of action is a property interest
which includes not only a defendant's interest in not being deprived of property
under the cause of action, but also the plaintiff's interest in bringing the cause of
action. Logan, 455 U.S. at 429. A claim "which presumably can be surrendered
for value, is at least as substantial as the right to an education labeled as prop-
erty in Goss v. Lopez [419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975)]." Logan, 455 U.S. at 431.
I am not approaching this problem from the perspective of arbitrary gov-
ernmental actions. I do not question that the government may, in the process of
creating statutory rights, limit them in certain ways and that the government may
eventually alter the statutory right. Id. at 432. See generally M. GLENDON, THE
NEW FAMILY AND NEW PROPERTY (1981); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J.
733 (1964).
39. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS introductory note (1932); Hohfeld,
supra note 12, at 24; Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The
Development of the 1odern Concept of Property, 29 BUFFALO L. REv. 325, 357-60
(1980).
40. A.M. Honore, Ownership in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107-47
(A. Guest ed. 1961).
438 [Vol. 34: p. 429
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the cause of action dependent on the status of others. 4 1 The idea
of possession of its entirety is inevitably limited by the underlying
statement of who may sue and under what conditions.
42
. Under each of these causes of action, the statutory plaintiff's
interests are limited not only by any procedural requirements, but
also by the limitations inherent in the substantive right. For ex-
ample, a common attribute of property is the incidence of trans-
ferability or alienation.43 To the extent that private rights of
action are tied to the underlying substantive right, they are not
subject to transfer in the same way that a parcel of land is. A
person within the jurisdiction of the United States cannot give or
sell the right to sue under section 1983 to a non-citizen who lives
abroad. Nor can a non-management employee covered by the
FLSA give or sell his or her right to minimum wage to an exempt
employee. 44 In other words, the ability to alienate is limited by
the definition of the private right to sue. When we discuss
whether an individual may waive his or her private right of action,
we are speaking of a form of transfer. It is not a radical notion
that transfer in the form of waiver, or even settlement, is limited
in the same way that the transfer of the right to sue is limited.
We can also examine private rights of action from the per-
spective of the grantor. Just as a grantor carves out a portion of
its property to give away, the grantor can retain an interest in that
property. When the government is the grantor, that retained in-
terest can loosely be identified as representing the public interest.
Congress creates a limited interest in a private right of action and
there is nothing conceptually difficult about the idea that those
limits include limits on the ability to buy, sell or give away that
private right of action. Just as a co-owner in property cannot uni-
41. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1982) (excludes activities based on gross
sales and family business); Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 1120-23.
42. I recognize the slipperiness of this analysis since property rights exist
only because the government recognizes them. When Congress creates a pri-
vate right of action, it is stating that if the statutory requirements are met, the
courts are directed to recognize that property interest.
43. A.M. Honore, supra note 40, at 120-21 ("incident of transmissibility").
Honore uses the term "incident" rather than "right" of transmissibility because
transmissibility does not depend upon the individual's choice. Id.
44. Other common attributes of property are present in some private rights
of action. For example, some private causes of action are transmissible and
therefore survive the death of the holder. Many statutory private rights of action
are deemed survivable. For example, an action for minimum wage under the
FLSA is survivable. Mitchell v. Lancaster Milk Co., 185 F. Supp. 66, 71 (M.D.
Pa. 1960). Whether a cause of action under § 1983 is survivable is determined
by reference to state law under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). Robertson v.
Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 593-94 (1978).
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laterally sell the property, an owner of a private right of action is
limited by its co-owner's interests. For this reason, we look back
to congressional "intent" to identify the interests of the
government.
Just like a holder of land with the power to sue to exclude
trespassers, under all three of these statutory private rights of ac-
tion an individual has a right to sue if a violation has occurred, but
no duty to do so.45 It is a "right" to sue because the individual
empowered to sue exercises a personal choice. Although some
individuals may institute suit because they feel a "moral or polit-
ical dut[y] related to a community's normative life,"' 4 6 others do
not see instituting suit, with its concomitant personal burdens, as
a moral obligation.47 More importantly, there is no legal sanction
for the failure to institute suit even when an individual has been
the victim of a statutory violation. 48 Neither employers nor the
government has a right to demand that the employee either file
suit or refrain from filing suit.49 These statutory plaintiffs conse-
quently have a privilege-right, in Hohfeldian terms, to institute
suit. 50 It is this attribute of ownership that creates the possibility
of both waiver and settlement.
III. PARADIGMS OF WAIVING STATUTORY RIGHTS
Courts have taken two distinct approaches to waiver and set-
tlement of statutory causes of action. Courts seldom articulate
why they choose one approach over the other.5 1 The approach
selected, however, largely governs how the case is decided.
A. Contract-Commodification Model
A more recent example of the contract-commodification
model of statutory causes of action was presented by the Supreme
45. See J. WALDRON, supra note 11, at 8 (where "invocation of a sanction or
the effective implementation of a requirement depend on the initiation of a cer-
tain procedure" then "the concept of duty already seems to involve those of
power and liability").
46. Radin, M'arket-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1854 & n.21
(1987).
47. See infra Section IV A.
48. The statutory language is generally permissive. See supra Section II.
49. See Hohfeld, supra note 12, at 33-44; see also B. LEISER, CUSTOM, LAW
AND MORALITY 140-44 (1969).
50. Hohfeld, supra note 12, at 33-34.
51. For one author's view of why this might be so, see Fish, Dennis Alartinez
and the Uses of Theor,, 96 YAL.E L.J. 1773 (1987).
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Court's decision in Town of Newton v. Rumery. 5 2 In Rumery the
Supreme Court upheld the validity of an agreement in which a
local prosecutor agreed to drop criminal charges against a crimi-
nal defendant, Bernard Rumery, on the condition that Rumery
agree not to bring a section 1983 claim against the town of
Newton, New Hampshire. Rumery had been arrested and
charged with tampering with a witness based on two telephone
conversations that he had had with the main witness in a felonious
sexual assault charge being brought against one of Rumery's
friends. Rumery's attorney contacted the local prosecutor and
stated that the prosecutor "had better [dismiss] these charges, be-
cause we're going to win them and after that we're going to
sue." 53 Rumery's attorney and the local prosecutor negotiated
and agreed that the prosecutor would dismiss the criminal
charges if Rumery would agree not to sue the town, its officials, or
the complaining witness for any harm caused by the arrest.
Rumery signed the agreement. Ten months later he filed an ac-
tion under section 1983 alleging that the town and its officers had
violated his constitutional rights by arresting, defaming, and im-
prisoning him falsely. The district court granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss based on the release-dismissal agreement.
54
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, finding that
such release-dismissal agreements were per se invalid, 55 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
56
The Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that because
the agreement purported to waive a right to sue conferred by a
federal statute, the validity of the waiver was to be governed by
federal law. 5 7 The Supreme Court's point of reference was not
52. 480 U.S. 386 (1987). For a very fine analysis of Rumery in light of both
criminal law and § 1983 goals, see Kreimer, Releases, Redress, and Police Misconduct:
Reflections on Agreements to Waive Civil Rights Actions in Exchange for Dismissal of Crimi-
nal Charges, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1988). See also Note, 42 U.S.C. § 1983-
BuyingJustice." The Role of Release-Dismissal Agreements in the CriminalJustice System, 78
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1119 (1988).
53. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 390. The local prosecutor was the Deputy County
Attorney for Rockingham County. Id.
54. Id. at 391.
55. Rumery v. Town of Newton, 778 F.2d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 1985), rev'd, 480
U.S. 386 (1987).
56. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 475 U.S. 1118 (1986).
57. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 392. For an analysis of jurisdictional and choice-of-
law issues involved in the enforcement of civil rights settlement, see Solimine,
supra note 13, at 295. Professor Solimine argues that state law should govern
the interpretation of settlement agreements. Id. at 298. His analysis does not
apply to questions of whether waiver, as opposed to settlement, should be al-
lowed and what law should apply in considering the validity of waivers.
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the federal law of section 1983, however, but rather common law
contract doctrine. 58 Citing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the
Court concluded that "a promise is unenforceable if the interest
in its enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a public
policy harmed by enforcement of the agreement." 59 By presum-
ing the validity of the agreement absent a contrary public policy,
the Court immediately placed contract law as the point of refer-
ence. With this model, the public interest has to be affirmatively
shown and any failure of proof results in contract interests taking
precedence.
60
By using a contract doctrine as the point of reference, the
Court naturally focused on contract concepts of consideration. In
refusing to adopt a per se rule invalidating such release-dismissal
agreements, the Court explained in detail why this criminal de-
fendant might very rationally decide that it was a good deal to
give up his right to a civil rights suit in return for having the crim-
inal charges dropped.6 1 The Court, however, failed to examine
fully the consideration. In this case, the criminal action and the
threatened civil action were not independent suits. Rather, the
civil action was a challenge to the ongoing criminal charge. The
consideration for dropping the criminal charge was not a reduced
plea in the criminal case, as is typically the case with plea bargain-
ing.62 Rather, if Mr. Rumery's claims were true, the consideration
for not bringing a civil suit was to cease the ongoing unconstitu-
tional activity. Infused through the bargain is the possibility that
the state would have continued the alleged unconstitutional activity
if Mr. Rumery had refused to sign the release-dismissal agree-
ment. If Mr. Rumery's claims were true, the offer was attractive to
Mr. Rumery not because the prosecutor could make the defend-
ant better off than he had been before the state's arrest, but
rather because the prosecutor was offering to place the defendant
in the position he had been in before the state's intervention.
63 If
58. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 392.
59. Id. at 392 & n.2 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1)
(1981)).
60. Cf Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 & n.3 (1980) (where for-
mer CIA employee breached contract to submit manuscript for publication re-
view, valid remedies included enjoining future breaches and imposing
constructive trust on profits; first amendment concerns dismissed in footnote).
61. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 394.
62. See id. at 393 & n.3, 409 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 52, at
1119.
63. See Rumery, 480 U.S. at 408 (Stevens,J., dissenting). There had been no
findings on the merits of Mr. Rumery's § 1983 claim. Id. at411 n.13 (Stevens,J.,
dissenting). There was evidence, however, that the state's witness tampering
442 [Vol. 34: p. 429
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Mr. Rumery's claim that the arrest was illegal were true, then the
state's act was similar to stealing a car and then using it as consid-
eration to force other concessions from the owner.
64
The Court identified what seemed like randomly-selected
public interests that were involved in its decision to allow waiver
of a section 1983 claim. 65 The Court first noted a public interest
based on traditional contract limitations that the process of reach-
ing agreement not be coercive.66 There is a public interest, the
Court observed, in "opposing involuntary waiver of constitu-
tional rights." 67 The Court found that the interest was not im-
pinged in this case, however, because it concluded that Rumery
had "voluntarily" waived his right to sue. The Court carefully
pointed out the rationality of Rumery's decision to support the
claim that his actions were voluntary: "The benefits of the agree-
ment to Rumery are obvious: he gained immunity from criminal
prosecution in consideration of abandoning a civil suit that he
may well have lost." 68 The Court used a market methodology by
engaging in a cost-benefit analysis from the perspective of the
criminal defendant.
69
By using rationality as a synonym for voluntariness, the
Court lost an important perspective. One might rationally give up
the right to free speech in order to stop a beating, but that does
not make the decision voluntary in the sense of offering meaning-
ful and lawful alternatives. 70 Justice O'Connor did not join the
final section of the opinion and, consequently, a plurality of the
Court was left to skirt this issue and attempt to diffuse a strong
dissent by asserting that in this case the only evidence of
prosecutorial misconduct was the agreement itself.7' There was
case against Mr. Rumery was very weak. See id. at 404-06 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
64. See id. at 408 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. Justice O'Connor concurred separately in the portion of the opinion in
which the Court discussed the various public interests, making this discussion a
plurality view. Id. at 394-97.
66. Id. at 394.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 46, at 1861. Although the Court was evaluat-
ing the exchange of a quasi-monetary interest (bringing suit) for a non-monetary
interest (dropping charges), the opinion leaves little basis to distinguish a mone-
tary valuation.
70. Cf Simon, Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of
Full Preference, 67 B.U.L. REV. 213, 238-39 (1987) (example of plaintiff extending
arm and permitting vaccination where alternative was quarantine).
71. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 397.
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no comment on possible police misconduct.72
The plurality in Rumery then discussed whether some "exter-
nal" public interests were present to render release-dismissal
agreements void.73 In effect, the plurality used a cost-benefit
analysis from the perspective of section 1983. Although the plu-
rality acknowledged that these agreements might "tempt prosecu-
tors to trump up charges in reaction to a defendant's civil rights
claim, suppress evidence of police misconduct, and leave un-
remedied deprivations of constitutional rights,"'74 the plurality
summarily dismissed the claim that these agreements might en-
courage violations of federal civil rights as too diffuse a public
interest. Instead, the plurality minimized any public character of
section 1983 and emphasized Rumery's personal interest:
It is true, of course, that § 1983 actions to vindicate civil
rights may further significant public interests. But it is
important to remember that Rumery had no public duty
to institute a § 1983 action merely to further the public's
interest in revealing police misconduct. Congress has
confided the decision to bring such actions to the injured
individuals, not to the public at large. Thus, we hesitate
to elevate more diffused public interests above Rumery's
considered decision that he would benefit personally
from the agreement.
75
The plurality made a significant leap in logic by stating that
because there is no public duty, the public interest is too diffuse.
There is no public duty to report the commission of a crime, but
there is an enormous public interest in having crime reported.
This statement also fails to consider a significant function of pri-
vate rights of action under section 1983: to deter constitutional
violations by public officials. 76 Concluding its analysis, the plural-
ity then found that other "important public interests"-avoiding
the burden of defending "marginal" and "unjust" suits, deferral
72. It was the possibility of a broader abuse of "the criminal process" that
led Justice O'Connor to concur in this portion of the opinion, although she con-
cluded in this case that there had been no abuse. Id. at 399-402 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
73. Id. at 394-97.
74. Id. at 394 (quoting Rumery v. Town of Newton, 778 F.2d 66, 69 (1st
Cir. 1985), rev'd, 480 U.S. 386 (1987)).
75. Id. at 394-95. Ironically, the Court acknowledged that the state's bene-
fits from release-dismissal agreements are not as "tangible" as those the state
obtains from plea bargains, yet dismissed this fact. Id. at 393 n.3.
76. See infra note 82.
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to the presumptive good faith decisions of prosecutors-would be
harmed by a per se rule that such release-dismissal agreements are
invalid. 77 These other secondary public interests were given
greater weight than the "diffuse" public interest contained in sec-
tion 1983.78 With this approach, the plurality uses a "simple con-
tractual metaphor, as if constitutional rights are bushels of wheat
and the Constitution itself the Restatement (Second) of Contracts."79
The contract-commodification model gives maximum weight
to the decisions of presumptively autonomous individuals to elect
to waive a statutory protection. By using a contract model the
Rumery Court creates a presumption of "waiveability" which usu-
ally can be overcome only by some policy reason expressed in the
statute, couched in terms of congressional purpose or intent,
prohibiting waiver. Traditional market methodology would disal-
low waiver-making the cause of action inalienable-only if there
were a market failure.80 But as Rumery demonstrates, market fail-
ure is often inadequately considered by the courts. For example,
the most common form of market failure analysis would be that
commodification imposes external, large-scale social costs on the
public, and the only way to minimize these costs would be to limit
alienability.8 1 The court in Rumery quickly dismissed one signifi-
cant external cost-the diminished enforcement of the deterrent
goals of section 1983-and never discussed the external costs of
diminished enforcement of the compensatory goals of section
77. Rumey, 408 U.S. at 395-97.
78. I call these other "important public interests" secondary because they
derive not directly from § 1983, but rather exist as generic interests largely
grounded in expediency.
79. Leaman v. Ohio Dep't of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 825
F.2d 946, 958 (6th Cir. 1987) (Keith,J., dissenting) (objecting to court's conclu-
sion that state law provision for waiver of "any cause of action" by filing suit
against state in state court prohibited plaintiff from bringing § 1983 action in
either state or federal forum), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2844 (1988). See also Cange
v. Stotler & Co., 826 F.2d 581, 596 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook,J., concurring)
(Rumery and other cited decisions "start from the premise that people may strike
such bargains as they please."). Rumery is not the only example in which the
Supreme Court has approached issues with the implicit assumption that a partic-
ular right is a private commodity. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-
17 (1980) (woman's right to abort fetus for health reasons); Tribe, The Abortion
Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Depen-
dence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 336 (1985) (same).
80. See Radin, supra note 46, at 1859.
81. See id. at 1864; see also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18, at 1111 (ina-
lienability may be justified where cost to third parties is significant); Epstein, IVhV
Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970 (1985). These external costs are the
absence of the benefit. See infra Sections IV & V.
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1983.82 Nor did the Court fully consider the possible normative
aspect of section 1983; the statute sets out appropriate behavior
for public officials.8 3 In other words, the Court was using market
analysis without rigorously applying market theory to determine
whether there had been market failure.
In addition, using a contract-commodification model imme-
diately diminishes the public component of the cause of action by
elevating the private component. A contract analysis treats the
statutory cause of action as a "personal possession[], entirely de-
fined and controlled by the person authorized to invoke [it]."84
Implicit in a contract-commodification analysis is the idea that the
person contracting has the power to contract concerning the sub-
ject matter. This may be an appropriate approach where the indi-
viduals contracting have created the underlying right, such as
allowing waiver of a privately negotiated contract requirement.
As noted in Section II, however, this is not necessarily applicable
where the right is created by public law. 85 This commodification
model creates an atmosphere in which only the strongest and
most aggressive public interest will be protected.
Also, any statutory private right of action is a governmental
act interfering with the market. In many instances this entry into
the market was justified because of inequality of bargaining
power. If inequality of bargaining power were a reason for creat-
ing the statutory right to sue, then "so long as the party with the
greater bargaining power can force the other to waive whatever
liabilit[ies] [are created], he [or she] can easily restore the original
imbalance" the statute was designed to correct. 86
Finally, even the process of negotiation may create a coercive
environment, making "free choice," whatever that is, more diffi-
cult than it is where there are less coercive surroundings. For ex-
82. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 268 (1981) (deter-
rence is important purpose of § 1983; compensation is also an interest); Monell
v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 683-87 (1978) (remedial purpose
of § 1983).
83. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18, at 1111-12 ("moralisms" may
justify inalienability); Radin, supra note 46, at 1868-89 (normative rationales for
inalienability); Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 931, 932-33 (1985) ("certain specialized distributive goals" may
justify inalienability).
84. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV. 478, 529
(1981).
85. Just as I have freedom to contract to sell my car, I do not have freedom
to contract unilaterally to sell a car that is owned jointly by myself and another.
86. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 771
(1983).
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ample, the Rumery Court considered the fact that the criminal
defendant was not in jail at the time of the negotiation. But as the
dissenters pointed out, the majority opinion did not consider the
coercive power of criminal prosecution. Even rules of profes-
sional responsibility, notorious for setting bare minimum stan-
dards of conduct for lawyers, recognize the inherently coercive
nature of threatening criminal prosecution to gain advantage in a
civil suit and expressly forbid such threats.
87
B. "Right-Duty" Model
Rather than start from a strong presumption that bargains
over statutory rights are proper, the Supreme Court on other oc-
casions has focused immediately upon the nature of the rights
created or the duties imposed by the statute. For example, in Al-
exander v. Gardner-Denver Co. ,88 the Supreme Court invalidated a
provision of a collective-bargaining agreement that required all
claims by employees arising out of their employment to be sub-
mitted to arbitration. The Court found the agreement invalid to
the extent that it attempted to waive the employee's right to bring
suit under Title VII. Alexander involved a prospective waiver of
the forum; in other words, whether the employee could waive his
or her statutory right to a trial de novo by agreeing to submit any
claims, including discrimination claims, to arbitration. The Court
gave short shrift to the argument that the employee could waive
his Title VII cause of action:
To begin, we think it clear that there can be no prospec-
tive waiver of an employee's rights under Title VII....
Title VII . . . stand[s] on plainly different ground [than
certain statutory rights related to collective activity,
which are granted to foster the process of bargaining
and properly may be exercised or relinquished by the
union to obtain economic benefits for union members];
it concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individ-
ual's right to equal employment opportunities. Title
VII's strictures are absolute and represent a congres-
sional command that each employee be free from dis-
criminatory practices. Of necessity, the rights conferred
can form no part of the collective-bargaining process
87. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-105(A) (1979) ("A
lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present crimi-
nal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.").
88. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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since waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount
congressional purpose behind Title VII.89
By using this rights-as-trump-card model, the Court escaped the
necessity of explaining why prospective waiver is inappropriate
under Title VII.90 Rather, the Court cited the "congressional
command" that each employee be free from discriminatory prac-
tices. All private rights of action, however, are connected to a
"congressional command." Section 1983 contains a "congres-
sional command" that each person be free to use the rights, privi-
leges and immunities of the Constitution and laws. By focusing
on the concept of "right," the Court immediately elevated the pri-
vate right of action as presumptively embodying a public interest
that cannot be waived. This result may be correct, but this analy-
sis does not show how the Court got there.
In at least one instance the Supreme Court has provided a
more developed justification for finding settlement invalid. In
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil,9 1 the Supreme Court prohibited
settlement of liquidated damages provisions of the FLSA. Under
the FLSA, if an employer fails to pay minimum wage and over-
time, the employer becomes liable not only for the unpaid wages
but also for an equal amount in liquidated damages. 92 In O'Neil,
the employer settled an overtime wage dispute with an employee
by tendering the wages due on the condition that the employee
abandon his right to liquidated damages. In a subsequent suit to
recover the liquidated damages the Court found the agreement
invalid, concluding that to allow this type of agreement would
nullify the purpose of the FLSA: to protect certain groups from
sub-standard wages that they could not obtain due to unequal
bargaining power.93 The Court also noted the competitive ad-
vantage that an employer would gain "by reason of the fact that
his employees are more willing to waive claims for liquidated
damages than are those of his competitor." 94 The Court began
its analysis by looking to the rights and duties given and imposed
under the FLSA. When confronted with a case in the context of
familiar market commodities (money), the Court readily saw that
89. Id. at 51.
90. For a discussion of the "Rights as Trumps" concept, see R. DWORKIN,
TRUMPS AS RIGHTS, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 153.
91. 324 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1945). The Court in O'Neil used the word
"waiver," but as defined here the proper term would be settlement.
92. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
93. O'Neil, 324 U.S. at 706-07.
94. Id. at 710 (footnote omitted).
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market failure (unequal bargaining power) would be perpetuated
by allowing settlement.
Elevating the rights and duties imposed by the statute em-
phasizes the usually undefined public interest in the statute. It at
least puts the risk of erroneous interpretation on the side of pro-
tecting the public interest in the statute. But it also allows the
courts to ignore a private interest in the cause of action. As the
following section discusses, there is a significant private interest
in private rights of action.
IV. IDENTIFYING INTERESTS WITH FEDERAL STATUTORY
CAUSES OF ACTION
As discussed above, there are public interests in private
rights of action that are easily lost in a market-commodification
model of waiver. But similarly, there are private interests in pri-
vate rights of action that go unarticulated in a pure "rights" based
approach. By setting forth in greater detail those interests, we
can identify why a presumption of non-waiver is the best ap-
proach to private rights of action.
A. Private Interests-Or Why Aggrieved Individuals Do and Don't Sue
The technique of granting a privilege to institute suit appears
to stem from two characteristics of private rights of action. First,
private causes of action assume some private enforcement, which
will ease administrative costs of enforcing statutes. 95 The EEOC
has authority to institute action under Title V1196 and the Depart-
ment of Labor is charged with enforcing the FLSA. 97 And, as
noted below, these private actions inevitably influence govern-
ment enforcement. Even section 1983, whose closest govern-
mental counterpart is a statute making it a crime to violate civil
rights, influences and complements its governmental counter-
part.9 8 Under each statute enforcement is heavily supplemented
by private actions. As discussed below, this supposition, that pri-
95. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1983) ("[A]lthough
the 1972 amendment to Title VII empowers the [Equal Employment Opportu-
nity] Commission to bring its own actions, the private right of action remains an
essential means of obtainingjudicial enforcement of Title VII."). One need only
look at the extensive chronicle of private cases (set out in the U.S. Code Anno-
tated) brought under each of these statutes to note the significant role private
enforcement has under each statute.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
98. See, e.g, Canty v. City of Richmond Police Dep't, 383 F. Supp. 1396,
1401 & n.3 (E.D. Va. 1974) ("under color of law" under § 242 means same thing
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vate rights of action will increase enforcement of statutes, seems
well borne out.
Second, implicit in granting a right to sue is an assumption
that aggrieved individuals will have a distinct personal interest
that will motivate the aggrieved person to file a private right of
action. Congress assumes that "those in the protected class can
and will accept" the burden "to identify violations, report them to
public authorities [if Title VII violations], and participate in en-
forcement proceedings." 99 This assumption is only partially
true.'00 Taken as a whole, only a small portion of the civil dis-
putes that could be brought to the courts actually come to the
attention of a lawyer, even fewer result in a lawsuit, and far fewer
go to trial.1'1 This pattern of non-use of private rights of action is
particularly noticeable in employment discrimination suits.
10 2
If there were reason to believe that the decisions not to in-
voke a private right of action were based on an assessment of the
merits of the suit as compared to the benefits to be gained by the
statutory remedy, then private choice would be little different
from an administrative agency's or prosecutor's decision that re-
sources would be better spent on other endeavors. Unfortu-
nately, these are not the only factors that cause individuals to
bypass an opportunity to institute a private right of action. An
individual's willingness, and even ability, to invoke the power of
the state are heavily influenced by personal values, which in turn
are formed by cultural values. To sue may go against the individ-
ual's socially constructed view of what is "normal behavior, re-
spectability, responsibility" and being a "good person."' 0 3 Not
everyone resolves conflict through an adversary model of positive
rights. Indeed, resort to litigation may be a public announcement
as similar phrase in § 1983), aff'd sub nom. Canty v. Brown, 526 F.2d 587 (4th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1062 (1976).
99. Bumiller, Victims in the Shadow of the Law: A C itique of the Model of Legal
Protection, SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 421, 422 (1987).
100. The decision to initiate a formal dispute through litigation appears to
vary with the types and perceived seriousness of the problems. Miller & Sarat,
Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversar , Culture, 15 LAW & Soc'y REV.
525, 562-63 (1980-81). Taken as a whole, however, there is a striking amount of
non-enforcement of potential claims.
101. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 8
(1986). See Mayhew, Institutions of Representations: CivilJustice and the Public, 9 LAW
& Soc'' REV. 401, 413-14 (1975) (study of Detroit area).
102. Bumiller, supra note 99, at 424; Galanter, supra note 101, at 19; Miller
& Sarat, supra note 100, at 544-45.
103. Merry & Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of Dis-
pute, 9Jus. Sys. j. 151, 157 (1984).
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that one's ability to reason and compromise has failed. Conse-
quently, it is not surprising that the level of disputing varies with
economic class and religion.
10 4
Even those who have a social concept that encourages them
to bring a private right of action face impediments. To assume
that the particular legal problem is a "bipolar, rights-oriented,
isolated dispute" is inaccurate. 0 5 The choice granted by a statute
for many aggrieved persons is to make big waves or no waves, a
choice between "rebellion and submission" 0 6 often after a situa-
tion has deteriorated beyond repair. In addition, one attribute of
each of the three statutory examples is that there is usually a strik-
ing disparity in bargaining power between the employee and em-
ployer in the case of the FLSA and Title VII, and between the
individual and the state in the case of section 1983.107 A mere
statement by Congress that an aggrieved individual is now em-
powered to sue does not change this power relationship but sim-
ply superimposes the statutory right over the underlying
relationship. Because of these power disparities, individuals with
private rights of action often face significant hurdles in winning a
suit. "Plaintiffs bring lawsuits, and push them to trial, after as-
sessing the chances and amount of recovery."'' 08 The chances of
success include variables such as "the hurdles posed by the law,
the bias of the judge, [and] the nature of the defendant."' 1 9 The
perceived difficulty of fighting the dragon inevitably affects
whether an individual litigant will invest the time, money, and en-
ergy in fighting.
Even if an aggrieved individual decides to sue, there are emo-
tional, financial and social costs to that decision. To sue places a
104. Id. at 176. See also C. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE 155 (1986)
("[B]y refusing to engage in open dispute, [Baptist] church members reaffirm
the power of their own faith and simultaneously believe they are witnesses to the
potential defendant.").
105. Bumiller, supra note 99, at 423.
106. Id. at 429, 437.
107. Schwab & Eisenberg, CONSTITUTIONAL TORT LITIGATION IN THREE Dis-
TRICTS, THE GOVERNMENT As DEFENDANT, AND COUNSEL'S INCENTIVES 49-73
(Working Paper No. 34, Stanford Law School Law and Economics Program, Au-
gust 1987) (discussing lower success rate in constitutional tort cases where gov-
ernment is defendant) (revised version published as Schwab & Eisenberg,
Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Iiiflience of the Attorney Fees Statite and
the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719 (1988)).
108. Id. at 37.
109. Id. As the Schwab and Eisenberg study notes, if the law is more ran-
dom toward constitutional torts than other suits, risk aversion may also impede
plaintifll from filing suits. Id. at 37 n.68.
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label on the individual. That label may be positive in the eyes of
some, but is often starkly negative in the eyes of others. To sue
means making a fuss, labeling oneself as a "victim,""l 0 exposing
oneself to non-statutorily regulated methods of harassment'''
and to the expensive, disruptive and, often painful, process of liti-
gation.' 12 With private rights of action the individual is asked to
bear all the costs yet, as noted below in identifying the public in-
terest in private rights of action, the individual receives only part
of the benefit. 1'
3
All these reasons indicate why individuals who believe that
they have been aggrieved nonetheless elect not to institute suit.
Conversely, those who do invoke suit may do so for many rea-
sons, some of which may correspond to Congress' reasons for
passing the statute, but others may not.' 14 Some sue to vindicate
principle, 115 others to vent anger and frustration. 116 Incarcerated
prisoners are notorious for filing suit, frequently marginal, in part
for principle, but often just to fill up their time.' 1
7
Recognizing the multiple variables for why people sue is im-
portant in determining how courts should react to private rights
of action. As seen above, neither courts nor Congress can assume
110. Bumiller, supra note 99, at 433.
111. Id. at 436.
112. Galanter, supra note 101, at 9.
113. See infra Sections IV B & C.
114. This sentence is written on the generous assumption that Congress'
intent can be ascertained.
115. See Galanter, supra note 101, at 18; Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer &
Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 73, 76 n.9, 79 (1983).
116. Merry & Silbey, supra note 103, at 157 (going to court over personal
problems seems to be characteristic of people with more chaotic, unstable per-
sonal lives). It is my anecdotal opinion that many employment discrimination
suits, particularly age discrimination actions, are at their heart alienation of af-
fection suits. For an interesting discussion of why this might be so, see M. GLEN-
DON, supra note 38, at 200-05.
117. Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 107, at 110-11 ("[n]ationally, prison-
ers bring many more constitutional tort actions than do nonprisoners, a much
higher fraction of the cases brought are unsuccessful, and counsel bring rela-
tively few of the actions"); Note, Controlling and Detering Frivolons In Forina
Pauperis Complaints, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1165, 1166 (1987). C]. Town of Newton
v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 387 (1987) ("[m]any [§ 1983 suits] are marginal and
some are frivolous"); Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1071 (11 th Cir. 1986)
(recent explosion of prisoner litigation in federal courts). The Schwab and Ei-
senberg study indicates that prisoner cases in which the plaintiff has counsel
have a comparable success rate to nonprisoner cases. If the meritorious cases
had counsel, these disparities would be unproblematic. Their data indicate,
however, that the private market in their study fails to supply counsel for many
meritorious prisoner constitutional tort suits. Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note
107, at 116.
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that aggrieved individuals will invoke private rights of action in
most cases in which a statutory violation has occurred. The giv-
ing of a right, but not the duty, to file a private right of action
when a statutory violation occurs reflects implicitly Congress' un-
derstanding that filing a suit imposes costs on the individual that
society should not force upon the person." 18 To impose a duty to
institute suit would be to ask a person to accept potentially high
personal cost for a personal benefit that the person may not value
highly. By giving a right, but not a duty, the government and the
public will receive the benefits of enforcement by those who do
sue. For the remaining cases unsatisfied by private rights of ac-
tion, the alternative method of enforcing the public interest is by
administrative enforcement through such entities as the EEOC,
the United States Attorney General, or the Department of Labor.
But, to say that one will not be forced to bring suit is quite
different from saying one may sell that right to bring suit. The
difference is reflected largely in the public interest underlying
federal statutory private rights of action.
B. The Public Interest
There is a generic public interest in all civil litigation, at least
to the extent that governmental resources-the courts-are used
to resolve the dispute.' ' 9 But federal statutory causes of action
involve a far more significant public interest. The mere fact that
Congress uses its constitutional authority to regulate private in-
teractions indicates some effect or consequence of those private
acts on the public at large. For example, in the statutory exam-
ples set forth above, the FLSA and Title VII were passed using
the authority of the commerce clause. 121 Section 1983 was
passed pursuant to the fourteenth amendment of the Constitu-
118. Imposing a duty to sue would also pose enormous enforcement
problems. Would it be a crime not to pursue a private suit? If so, at what point
is the violation sufficiently obvious to trigger this duty? If imposing a duty is not
a crime, who will enforce this duty? Certainly few defendants will complain if a
potential plaintiff fails to fulfill her duty to file suit.
119. Rotunda, The Public Interest Appellant: Limitations on the Rig/it of Competent
Parties to Settle Litigation Out of Court, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 199, 200 (1971) (generic
public interests include avoiding delay, preventing obstruction of jtstice and
preserving integrity of judicial process).
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249 (1964) (Congress passed Civil Rights Act of
1964 on authority of § 5, equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
and commerce clause, art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
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tion. ' The mere presence of federal positive law indicates ab
initio that there are interests-however slight-involved in the
statute beyond the private interactions of the parties regulated.
This public interest, being the least common denominator of all
federal legislation, may not be sufficient to override private inter-
ests, but it nonetheless exists.
The public character is strongly reflected in administrative
enforcement mechanisms. Under each of these statutes there are
governmental mechanisms for instituting suit which can be in-
voked without the cooperation of the right-holder. For example,
under Title VII a claimant is required to file a charge with the
EEOC as a precondition to filing suit.' 22 The purpose of this
charge is to notify the EEOC that the filer believes that an em-
ployer has violated the statutory requirements. 23 Consistent
with this purpose of filing a charge with the EEOC, a charge can
be filed by any person, including one who is not personally af-
fected. 2 4 The EEOC can institute suit at its own initiative. 25 A
settlement can waive the employee's right to recover in a suit
brought by the EEOC on the employee's behalf, but cannot waive
the EEOC's distinct interests in having conduct declared unlaw-
ful. 126 Consequently, each cause of action is not purely an indi-
vidual one, but has a clear public component that can be enforced
by someone other than the right-holder.
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. For a history of § 1983, see Developments
in the Law, Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1153-56 (1977).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982).
123. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68 (1984); EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc.,
L'Oreal Hair Care Div., 821 F.2d 1085. 1089 (5th Cir. 1987).
124. 29 C.F.R. § 1626.4 (1988) (EEOC "[s]hall also receive information
concerning alleged violations of the [ADEA] including charges and complaints
from any source").
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982) (charge can be filed by member of
Commission); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1982) (Commission may bring civil ac-
tion). Because there is no single listing of statutes providing private rights of
action, it is difficult to state categorically that all statutes granting private rights
of action have a similar government enforcement mechanism. We know that a
great many federal commissions, such as the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, the Consumer Product
Safety Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and Executive De-
partments, such as the Department of justice, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, and the Department of Education, exist to enforce statutes
that also have private rights of action.
126. Cosmair, 821 F.2d at 1091 (employee can waive right to recover in own
suit or in suit brought by EEOC but cannot waive right to file charge with
EEOC) (citations omitted). See also EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp.. 813
F.2d 1539, 1543 (9th Cir. 1987) (backpay claim by EEOC on behalf of employee
who settled Title VII claim is moot).
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But administrative enforcement is not the only voice repre-
senting the public interest. As the Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged, when the EEOC acts upon a complaint, "albeit at the
behest of and for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to
vindicate the public interest in preventing employment discrimi-
nation."' 27 When a private litigant initiates a private cause of ac-
tion, that litigant also acts not only to serve a private interest, but
necessarily "also vindicates the important congressional policy"
behind the underlying statute.' 28 This occurs because the sub-
stantive right usually does not distinguish between public or pri-
vate enforcement. 2 9 The underlying cause of action is the same,
only the parties empowered to sue are distinct. Consequently,
when a court issues a momentarily determinative interpretation of
a federal statute, both public and private enforcers are bound.
For example, a private litigant under Title VII may sue, but the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute will bind the EEOC.
It is simply impossible to keep the public and private components
of federal causes of action distinct.
Without any articulated justification, the Court in Rumery
concluded that initiating a private cause of action under section
1983 vindicates primarily private interests. While it is true that
section 1983 does not have a direct civil governmental enforce-
ment counterpart, like Title VII and the FLSA, section 1983's
public character may be even stronger than those statutes because
it acts to regulate the relationship between citizens and govern-
ment. Thus, "by the very nature of a section 1983 action, the
government is an interested party and the interests affected are of
constitutional magnitude."' 3 0 The Supreme Court's actions to
discount the public interest in section 1983 may be due to the
127. General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326
(1980) (footnote omitted); Cosmair, 821 F.2d at 1090; Goodyear Aerospace, 813 F.2d
at 1542-43.
128. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974) (citations
omitted); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per
curiam) (congressional policy that private litigant also serve as private attorney
general is of highest priority).
129. The government may be entitled to broader remedies than damages.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982) (criminal penalties imposed upon individuals
who discriminate against or deprive others of their constitutional rights under
color of state law); 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1982) (permits suits for injunctive relief for
all affected employees without requiring that employees be named in the
complaint).
130. Leaman v. Ohio Dep't of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities. 825
F.2d 946, 959 (6th Cir. 1987) (Keith, .. , dissenting), cert. deied, 108 S. Ct. 2844
(1988).
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Court's fairly consistent restrictive interpretation of section
1983.131 Whatever the cause, ignoring the public interest of sec-
tion 1983 is imprudent.
C. Joint Interest: Deterrence and Enforcement
It is impossible to keep public and private interests distinct in
one other very significant way. At the heart of most command
statutes is a deterrence goal. Congress wishes to stop particular
conduct either because the conduct itself directly causes harm, or
because secondary consequences of the conduct cause harm.
When a defendant is sued by either the government itself or a
private litigant suing under a private right of action, there is an
obvious effect on that defendant. As noted by observers of the
deterrent effect of law, this specific deterrence may take four
forms. 132 The defendant may be deterred by fear of being caught
again, or may be deprived of resources with which to commit vio-
lations, or may increase surveillance which in turn reduces the un-
lawful conduct, or may actually change his or her underlying
attitudes so that the defendant is convinced that it is no longer
right to do the acts that violate the statute. 133 The individual
plaintiff is an obvious beneficiary of each of the deterrent effects if
the plaintiff stays in any type of relationship with that defendant.
But the more likely beneficiaries of the deterrence effect of an
individual plaintiff's enforcement are other potential plaintiffs.
And that deterrent effect works to a greater or lesser extent
whether it is the government or the private litigant who sues. In
some cases a class action private suit may have a greater deterrent
effect than a government sponsored suit. In other cases the gov-
ernment may on average strike more fear in the hearts of statu-
tory violators. Because there is both public and private
enforcement, they act together to deter violators.
These specific deterrent effects on actual defendants ripple
out to affect all potential defendants, presenting an often power-
ful deterrent effect on others. Termed "general deterrence," this
results when information about the consequences of suit to a de-
fendant provides others in the class with information about the
13 1. See Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study,
67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 483 (1982).
132. Galanter, supra note 101 at 32-33 & n.105 (citingJ. GIBBS, CRIME, PUN-
ISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1975) and Feeley, The Concept of Laws in Social Science:
A Critique and Notes on an Expanded View, 10 LAW & Soc'' REV. 497, 517-21
(1976)).
133. Galanter, supra note 101, at 33.
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consequences of committing a violation. 134 For example, the
business journals extensively publicize suits brought by both the
government and private individuals under the securities laws.
13 5
Newspapers, too, often devote significant space to publicizing
lawsuits. 13 6 The most significant aspect of this deterrent effect is
that it occurs largely outside the courtroom and therefore outside
the control ofjudges. 3 7 When courts create rules, such as a rule
that a waiver is presumptively lawful absent congressional indica-
tions to the contrary, its effect will occur largely outside the court-
room. Against this backdrop, private parties will naturally adjust
their relationships accordingly.'
3 8
Similarly, potential defendants may actually change how they
assess the correctness of their conduct by observing lawsuits that
expose defendants engaging in statutory violations. 13 9 A private
suit that exposes a statutory violation has that same effect of pub-
licizing the defendant's conduct. For some, the application of the
law may affirm a potential defendant's assessment that the statu-
tory violation is indeed wrong.
140
This latter aspect of deterrence-the possibility of "reforma-
tion," changed attitudes or adaptive preference 4l-is particularly
134. Id. See also R. LABUNSKI, LIBEL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 225-27
(1987) (reports results of survey of reporters, editors, producers, and other jour-
nalists in which 80% surveyed had at least moderate level of concern about be-
ing sued); Galanter, supra note 36, at 124-42 (comparing general and specific
deterrent effects).
135. See, e.g., The SEC Makes Its Move on Drexel and Milken, Bus. Wk., Sept. 19,
1988, at 32; Drexel Burnham Charged by S.E.C. With Stock Fraud, N.Y. Times, Sept.
8, 1988, at A1, col. 6; Scheibla, Gold Scants: They're Bilking Investors Out of Hundreds
of Millions, Barron's, Sept. 5, 1988, at 54.
136. See, e.g., In Its Final Days of Defiance, Yonkers Had to Pick Its Fate, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 12, 1988, at Al, col. 1; Threat of Yonkers Layoffs Jolts Foes of Housing
Plan, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1988, at Al, col. 4.
137. See Galanter, supra note 36, at 121 ("The principal contribution of
courts to dispute resolution is the provision of a background of norms and pro-
cedures, against which negotiations and regulation in both private and govern-
mental settings takes place.").
138. See Feeley, supra note 132, at 515 ("the law is most often set in motion
by people who apply it to themselves and to each other without benefit of ex-
plicit mobilization of legal institutions").
139. Galanter, supra note 101, at 33. In the words of Professor Galanter:
"[C]ommunication of the existence of a law or its application by a court may
change the moral evaluation by others of a specific item of conduct. To the
extent that this involves not the calculation or the probability of being visited by
certain costs and benefits, but a change in moral estimation, we may call this
general effect enculturation." Id. (emphasis in original).
140. This is called "normative validation." See J. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISH-
MENT AND DETERRENCE (1975); Galanter, supra note 101, at 34.
141. Sunstein, Legal Interference With Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
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important. Few seriously contend that people's attitudes remain
unchanged in the face of the law.142 As William Muir concluded
in his study of attitude changes in the face of the Supreme Court's
prohibition of prayer in public schools, the law is unlikely to save
attitudes if it is opposed by all other social institutions. 43 But
where "there is no monolithic trend ... where the population is
ambivalent or indecisive or divided ... then legal institutions can
and apparently do shore up the partisans (or detractors) of that
attitude."' 144 Can law change attitudes?
Of course it can. It has done so-in reshaping in less
than a generation this nation's views about racism; in al-
tering in even a shorter time police attitudes toward
criminal behavior; in ennobling the city dweller as the
backbone of American democracy; in imparting an un-
derstanding of poverty; in recasting our ideas about lei-
sure; in maintaining certain attitudes of good
sportsmanship apparently essential to a competitive mar-
ket economy; in stemming religious prejudice; in estab-
lishing heightened standards of honesty and public
service. 14
5
Even if Muir is overly optimistic about the scope of attitude
changes in the face of the law, a public recognition that formerly
held attitudes are not the only way to conceive of a problem has
the effect of promoting a greater degree of tolerance.
Each of these deterrent effects, however, requires application
of the statute by either government or private litigants. Even in a
complex model of the relationship between law and behavior, any
behavioral benefits will not accrue unless there is some punish-
ment or ill-effect from engaging in the prohibited behavior.' 46
To the extent that the law has any moral force, that effect also
cannot occur if the law is not applied.
1129, 1146 (1986) (individuals may adapt their preferences if they believe they
cannot get original desires).
142. "There is suggestive evidence to indicate that at least some segments
of the population are subject to [enculturation]." Galanter, supra note 101, at 33
& n.107.
143. W. MUIR, PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SC1OOLS 135 (1967).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 138.
146. Paternoster, Examining Three-WIave Deterrence Models: A Question of Tel-
poral Order and Specification, 79J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 135, 176 (1988) ("[t]he
perceived certainty of punishment had a significant and nontrivial deterrent ef-
fect on self-reported deviance").
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Successful application of a statute not only deters defend-
ants, but encourages plaintiffs. When a statutorily-protected class
sees a statute being enforced, that evidence of the vitality of the
cause of action inevitably affects potential plaintiffs. Tort griev-
ances provide a good example. Tort grievances are much more
likely to result in claims than are discrimination claims. 147 Most
tort claims are not formally resisted and when court action is re-
quired lawyers are readily accessible.' 48 Successful resolution of
tort claims, with widespread acceptance of the validity of bringing
such claims, encourages others to pursue similar remedies.
49
Repeated claims also inevitably develop known, regularized
mechanisms and procedures for dealing with such claims, which
in turn encourage aggrieved persons actually to seek redress
either formally or informally.' 50 Unsuccessful enforcement, or
the absence of enforcement, inevitably discourages aggrieved
persons from pursuing statutory remedies.' 5' Actual enforce-
ment by either the government or private citizens provides not
only information about how to sue, but also a powerful symbol
for enforcement.
52
Any deterrent effect is determined by what the enforcers-
public and private-do or. fail to do. Any decision to ignore a
statutory violation has a small radiating consequence. Hence,
rules that discourage parties from suing have a similar radiating
consequence.
D. Waiver versus Settlement
The prior discussion has focused largely on the interests in
private rights of action. There are also distinct interests in the
process of dispute resolution. There is a public interest in encour-
aging settlement of disputes, both as a cost-effective method of
resolving disputes and because our judicial system is incapable of
bringing to trial all lawsuits filed.' 53 There is also a widespread
147. Miller & Sarat, supra note 100, at 545.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 563.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 563-64; see also Galanter, supra note 101, at 34; Schwab & Eisen-
berg, supra note 107, at 37 (discussing the "interactive nature of litigation";
"plaintiffs need not base the decision whether to file suit on a Platonic sense of
the 'goodness' of the claim, but rather on the likelihood of success given the law,
the decisionmaker, and the defendant").
152. Galanter, supra note 101, at 34.
153. See Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, supra note 115 at 122
("One of the most striking aspects of our study of litigation was that bargaining
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acceptance by lawyers, judges and the American public that the
primary role of American courts is to resolve disputes. 54 If these
were the sole principles governing waivers and settlements, then
courts would automatically structure rules to encourage resolu-
tion and avoidance of disputes.
Other interests, however, are present to temper the laudable
goal of dispute resolution. The very fact that we have a system of
stare decisis indicates that courts serve a valid, independent func-
tion in issuing dispositive public judicial pronouncements. 155
This allows not only for public resolution of disputes (which in
turn supports a normative view of the law), but it also serves to
satisfy a public notice interest in having public announcement of
the interpretation of laws. Our legal system also has a substantive
justice goal. At least one purpose of our legal system is "to pro-
vide fair and just results to the individual disputants and to soci-
ety."' 156 This is implicitly recognized in common law limitations
on settlements. 15
7
The courts also play a normative role even with settlements
in which they take no active part. When parties negotiate over
facts that have already occurred, they will use as a backdrop the
court's anticipated resolution of the dispute if it were to go to
trial. The parties will use as bargaining chips likely court out-
comes, jury verdicts, and chances on appeal. 158 In other words,
the parties bargain "in the shadow of the law."' 59
Even acknowledging a very strong interest in settling dis-
putes does not justify undifferentiated suit avoidance. Potential
defendants can avoid having suits brought against them by a
number of means. Potential defendants can act so that they do
not violate a statute, which significantly reduces their chances of
and settlement are the prevalent and, for plaintiffs, perhaps the most cost-effec-
tive activity that occurs when cases are filed").
154. Mankel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 485-86 (1985); Sander,
Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976).
155. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1087 (1984) (one advantage
ofjudicial decision is that it may meet "a genuine social need for an authoritative
interpretation of law"); McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J.
1660, 1664 (1985) (summarizing Fiss' reasons for preferring adjudication to
settlement).
156. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 154, at 489.
157. For example, to be enforced as a contract, settlements cannot be the
product of fraud or duress. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 (1981).
158. See Galanter, supra note 36 at 121.
159. Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979).
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having suits brought against them. Potential defendants can also
avoid having lawsuits brought by settling an impending suit, often
because the statutory violation is obvious. 160 Potential defend-
ants can also avoid suit by "buying off" potential plaintiffs before
the claimed wrongful act is taken or completed. In this latter
form of suit avoidance the parties move away from "the shadow
of the law" cast by the underlying statute.
V. RECONCILING THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS
A. Why It Makes a Difference When Aggrieved Individuals Don't Sue
and Why It Makes Even More of a Difference When
Aggrieved Individuals Don't Sue Because They've
Sold Their Privilege-Right
As discussed above, a decision not to sue may be motivated
by many factors not directly related to the statute. Yet each deci-
sion not to sue has a small, but incremental, effect on the underly-
ing statute. If that personal aspect of the lawsuit predominates,
then the private right of action should be left as a purely personal
decision, subject to no interference, even if the individual wishes
to sell that right prior to the accrual of the cause of action. At
least three reasons argue against wholly privatizing the cause of
action. First, as mentioned above, private acts have public conse-
quences. Every federal statutory cause of action has a public com-
ponent, albeit some more than others. Encouraging a policy of
commodification sets up an environment that diminishes, rather
than enhances, the public component of a right created by public
law. This diminution of the public component is subtle and diffi-
cult to give an objective and non-arbitrary cost value. The very
inability to determine an objective value indicates that the market
is incapable of taking into account this diminution of value.
16
Similarly, commodification will occur in situations in which
the same cause of action may have widely different values to the
prospective plaintiffs. The plaintiff who is dependent upon the
defendant for a job, or for allowing the plaintiff to get out of jail,
or for income from a stock will not value a cause of action as
160. For example, Title VII requires the EEOC to attempt to conciliate any
disputes it concludes have merit. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982) ("If the Com-
mission determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to be-
lieve that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any
such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion.").
161. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18, at 1111.
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much as one who has severed the relationship with the defend-
ant.162 This widely fluctuating valuation also inhibits creation of
any meaningful market in private rights of action.
163
Second, commodification does more than simply allow the
defendant-by paying off the potential plaintiff-to pretend that
the statute does not exist. When a statutory right is created, with
a correlative private right of action, the common law is changed.
The legal relationship between the statutory plaintiffs and de-
fendants has been altered and statutory plaintiffs as a class have-
at least in theory-been given a power that they did not have
before. These statutory plaintiffs may have also lost other rights
or powers of which they are not aware in return for the private
cause of action. When a statutory plaintiff prospectively or simul-
taneously waives a private right of action, it may appear initially
that the relationship has simply been returned to the pre-statute
relationship. There is a material difference, however. Courts
now have a duty to refrain from applying the statute (when
brought by the private plaintiff) by the force of the private con-
tractual agreement. 164 The courts will enforce the contract and
thereby condone the conduct allowed by it. By executing a
waiver, these prospective plaintiffs have, in effect, given permis-
sion to the statutory defendant to violate the statute. These statu-
tory defendants are now privileged to discriminate and the law
will be in a position of saying not only that "we will not stop you
from discriminating" but that "there is an agreement that the de-
fendant is privileged to discriminate." The statute's normative ef-
fect is therefore undermined. 65 The substantive law that was
waived no longer casts any shadow over those parties to the initial
agreement.
Finally, as part of each of these reasons, the starting point of
the analysis itself sends a message. A starting point that empha-
sizes the private nature of the cause of action-a presumption for
commodification-creates a frame of reference.166 By presuming
commodification, it implies that there is a ready market value, that
the private component is more important than the public compo-
162. See id. at 1094 & n.10.
163. The likely response to this argument is that the market will weed out
inefficient laws by allowing parties to privately order their relationship.
164. B. LEISER, supra note 49, at 145-47 (1969).
165. Cf Rubin, supra note 84, at 483 (most general definition of waiver is
"relinquishment of the right").
166. "We may buy or sell ourselves into the opposite direction, but we
must start somewhere." Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18, at 1100-01.
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nent. All these in turn send a message to both plaintiffs and de-
fendants. Defendants have a clear message that the statutory
duties may be bought and sold, thus buying a private repeal, and
hence have little normative value. Any ancillary goal of changing
attitudes is completely undermined, for allowing such an easy
"out" will inevitably arouse the contempt of those whose conduct
was to be regulated. 67 If one thinks the statutory goal is unim-
portant, one can simply buy his or her way out of it. Conversely,
if one can easily buy his or her way out of a public law, it must not
be very important.
Given the inherent public nature of private rights of action,
then, private rights of action should not be privatized. The pri-
vate interest in causes of action continues to be reflected in the
individual's choice not to sue. 168 The only limitation is that the
choice not to sue cannot be based on agreements that will alter
defendants' conduct. Because prospective waivers always create
an environment that alters defendants' conduct, these prospective
waivers should be disallowed as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion. Hence, the better rule of statutory construction is to create
a presumption of inalienability of a cause of action, which would
be rebutted by a clear statement or indication in the congres-
sional history that the private aspects of the cause of action
predominate.
B. Rights Changing Over Time-Settlement Versus Waiver
As noted above, settlement embodies interests distinct from
waiver. These interests become more distinct by considering how
both the public and private interests in causes of action change
over time. Property has a temporal dimension; time alone can
alter property interests. 169 In some instances there is a clear
cause and effect relationship. 170 With statutory private rights of
action, defendants' acts cause the creation of the private rights of
action. As noted above, there is also an interactive temporal di-
mension to causes of action. Successful use strengthens the cause
of action, which in turn encourages more use. This temporal di-
167. Cf J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 382-91 (1971).
168. Private ordering, then, continues to play a significant role. It cannot
supplant, however, the normative guidelines. Cf Galanter, supra note 36, at
131-32; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 159, at 986.
169. See Merrill, Time, Propertv Rights, and the Common Law: htroduction, 64
WASH. U.L.Q 661, 661 (1986).
170. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension ij the Law of Property, 64
WASH. U.L.Q 667, 667 (1986).
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mension can also reach backwards due to the lapse in time be-
tween the wrongful act and resolution of the claim. Changes in
judicial interpretations, larger or smaller jury awards, and even
changes in attitudes can reach back to make the present assess-
ment of the cause of action stronger or weaker, despite the inabil-
ity of all parties to relive the past facts. The courts and parties
will debate the significance of these past operative facts. How-
ever, what is important is not the past facts but the rereading and
recharacterization of events as judicial facts.171 "Thejudicial pro-
cess thus acts to create the reality" of the facts. 172
A statutory plaintiff's interest in the cause of action alters
with time in step with both of these aspects of the temporal di-
mension of the cause of action. Before any wrongful act has oc-
curred, persons listed as potential plaintiffs have an inchoate
right. If certain acts occur, that potential plaintiff will be empow-
ered to sue for a remedy. Even without a wrongful act, that indi-
vidual has an interest in the protections of the statute, for a well-
working statute will, through its deterrent effect, discourage stat-
utory wrongful acts. In other words, the mere possibility that one
can sue if a wrongful act is committed discourages commission of
the act. Because the cause of action is inchoate, however, it is
often difficult to point to a specific individual benefit. This very
point justifies noncommodification of waiver. The government's
interest is very strong, for a proper tension of inchoate rights to
sue discourages wrongful acts. The government is receiving a
low-cost benefit. No wrongful acts have occurred and the govern-
ment therefore avoids picking up the pieces if a violation occurs.
For example, as long as employers feel the deterrent effect of the
FLSA, employers will pay their employees the minimum wage. If
they do not pay the minimum wage, they know that they will be
subject to an effective enforcement action by either the govern-
ment or the aggrieved workers. The government has the best
possible scenario: statutory goals of regulating conduct are
achieved without individual harm to the prospective plaintiff.,
Once the claimed wrongful act has occurred, however, the
potential plaintiff is transformed into an empowered plaintiff. His
or her interest is no longer inchoate, for that plaintiff has suffered
specific harmful effects. Just as the individual's interest has been
transformed from being one of millions of workers to a worker
171. D. Brion, fWhat is a tay Baler?: The Seniotic Answer From Contrac Law, in
LAW AND SEMIOTICS: VOLUME 2, at 61 (1989).
172. Id. at 75.
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who has been harmed, the state's interest-although strong-is
now focused as well on the individual. The state can no longer
hope for deterrence in this case; it is too late. The state then
hopes for enforcement, which will in turn deter future violations.
Hence, there is the much greater acceptability of settlement; it
serves as a form of enforcement.
Although settlement continues to have a public interest di-
mension, its private elements are much stronger than waiver.
The defendant can not undo the wrongful act, but can only make
the plaintiff whole. The plaintiff is no longer considering specula-
tive benefits, but has facts to read, evaluate and characterize.
Similarly, the defendant is no longer able to completely deny the
force of the law. Even a common settlement provision stating
that settlement is not an admission of liability is not the same as a
judicial pronouncement that the defendant is not obligated to
meet the requirements of the 'statute. With settlement, then,
courts properly presume the ability to settle, absent indications to
the contrary under the statutory scheme. Settlement would be
inappropriate, of course, where Congress expressly disallows it.
But as with most questions of Waiver and settlement, Congress
seldom addresses the issue. The presumption of commodifica-
tion after the wrongful act-settlement-can be rebutted by clas-
sic market failure as related to the purpose of the statute.
Consequently, under the FLSA the Court quite properly found
that the inequality of bargaining power was the reason for impos-
ing minimum wage and overtime requirements on employers and
that the statute would fail if the parties could settle statutory lia-
bilities by using economic pressures on vulnerable plaintiffs.173
Congress, as well as the courts, should be aware of the dan-
gers of waivers. For the reasons noted above, Congress should
reflect strongly before allowing waiver. Waiver is not simply a
tipped hat to the free enterprise system. It is allowing private or-
dering to undermine the congressionally granted cause of action.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because of the public interest inherent in all private rights of
action and the interactive effect of use or non-use of the underly-
ing cause of action, courts should approach private rights of ac-
tion with a presumption of inalienability. In other words, holders
of rights of action may elect not to use the cause of action, but
173. Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706-07 (1945).
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should not be free to make prior enforceable agreements to waive
their right to bring a cause of action. With this as the operative
presumption, courts can then look to the underlying statute that
creates the cause of action to see if the statute indicates that that
presumption should not attach.
After the claimed wrongful acts have occurred, however, the
private interest in compensation arises, shifting the balance of in-
terests. Consequently, courts should approach settlement of pri-
vate rights of action with a rebuttable presumption of alienability.
With this as the operative presumption, courts can then look to
the underlying statute that creates the cause of action to see if the
statute indicates that the presumption should not attach.
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